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![3D"The](3D"http://philanthropy.com/icons/flag_opinion.gif"){kind=icon} From the issue dated March 20,=20
2008 The Quest to Protect Creative Policy IdeasSen. Hillary Rodham Clinton last year delivered a keynote = address to a=20 conference on big, new policy ideas sponsored by a Washington = think tank.=20 She flattered the audience by observing that "everyone in = Washington knows=20 there are a lot of good ideas knocking us over the head. We = haven't yet=20 decided to open the door and let them in." Senator Clinton's remark was not simply flattery, however. It = had an=20 element of truth to it because, as reporters and political = scientists=20 frequently observe, Congress often lacks the political motivation = to find=20 and champion good public-policy ideas out of fear that they would = offend=20 powerful special interests. However, another potential explanation for the lack of = innovation by=20 Congress is that think tanks and college scholars put too little = money=20 into developing such ideas because public-policy ideas can easily = be=20 stolen without legal or social sanction. It is time for = foundations, which=20 sponsor the bulk of this research, to change the rules of the game = so that=20 the incentives are to create rather than plagiarize socially = valuable=20 public-policy innovations. That people need incentives to engage in intellectual work is a = bedrock=20 assumption of modern economic thinking and was the reason = America's=20 founders included patent and copyright provisions in the = Constitution. It=20 is also why all major universities have strict prohibitions = against=20 plagiarism. Unfortunately, when it comes to public-policy ideas outside of = academe,=20 we have been blind to this type of economic logic =97 and for = good=20 reason. No one has figured out a way to legally protect = public-policy=20 innovation without doing more harm than good. The whole point of a = public-policy idea is that it can be copied and used by anybody, = not just=20 those who can afford to pay for it. The concept of plagiarism as applied to ideas is also = maddeningly=20 ambiguous. People of goodwill frequently disagree both on what = plagiarism=20 is and how much harm a particular act of plagiarism causes. Politically, the problem of public-policy plagiarism appears = equally=20 intractable. Nobody is organized to fight against public-policy = plagiarism=20 because such plagiarism predominantly harms the faceless public = rather=20 than powerful corporations or even public-policy experts. = Think-tank and=20 academic experts protect themselves against plagiarism simply by = avoiding=20 work in areas where they cannot protect themselves. The = consequence for=20 the public, however, is that the same old stale ideas dominate=20 public-policy discourse. At least partly because of the lack of protections for original = public-policy ideas, most think-tank experts focus on refining and = popularizing other people's ideas rather than developing new ones. = Writing=20 opinion articles, getting quoted in the news media, and speaking = at events=20 attended by high-ranking policy makers are accepted hallmarks of=20 think-tank success. At the other extreme are university scholars, who have = relatively=20 little incentive to develop public-policy ideas in a form usable = by=20 government officials. First, the traditional academic publishing cycle =97 often = more than=20 three years from first paper submission to publication =97 = causes=20 scholars to recognize that if they care about their publication = record,=20 they cannot afford to contribute to policy debates that usually = come and=20 go in a much shorter time. Second, scholars are rewarded for using rigorous empirical=20 methodologies, but a lot of the work to research and develop = public-policy=20 ideas deals with proposals that have never been put in place and = therefore=20 cannot be tested. Third, academics have strong incentives to be exquisitely = sensitive to=20 issues deemed important by their small circle of colleagues but = not by=20 those who make public policy. To the extent that policy makers = have strong=20 incentives to use the works of scholars (and the universities to = which=20 they belong) without crediting them, faculty members who have = careers to=20 worry about and families to feed rationally tune them out. Fortunately, the information-technology revolution is creating = new=20 opportunities to protect the ideas of think-tank experts and to = distribute=20 the ideas developed by academic scholars in a more timely and = relevant=20 way. The key is to duplicate the informal social sanctions against=20 plagiarism that work effectively in the academic world while = speeding up=20 the time it takes for an academic paper to get published by = separating the=20 process of publishing from peer review. Sanctions against plagiarism work in the academic world not = because=20 college faculty members are more moral than their think-tank = brethren but=20 because the sanctions are self-enforcing. Successful scholars, especially junior faculty members, = typically write=20 for a small community of colleagues who have the ability to easily = detect=20 plagiarism (because they are experts in their subject matter), = incentive=20 to expose plagiarism (because a plagiarized academic feels his own = reputation has been damaged), and ready means to punish = plagiarizers=20 (through academic peer review of hiring, publishing, and = conference=20 participation). In contrast, plagiarism is a shrewd strategy in the think-tank = world=20 because scholars there write for audiences =97 policy makers, = reporters, and grant makers who lack expertise in a particular = topic and=20 are not competitors for intellectual prestige. That is, their = audiences=20 lack both the motive and the ability to detect plagiarism. This = does not=20 mean their audiences are wholly indifferent to plagiarism; it only = means=20 that it hasn't ranked high on their list of priorities and hasn't = been=20 cost-effective to ferret out. The Internet now offers the promise of radically changing the=20 incentives for plagiarism so that the social sanctions against = plagiarism=20 that work in the academic world can be transferred to the = think-tank=20 world. As described in The Wealth of Networks, by Yochai = Benkler, a=20 professor at Harvard University and co-director of its Berkman = Center for=20 Internet & Society, a revolution is now taking place in the = economics=20 of community building and peer reviewing, as illustrated by such = services=20 as Google, Amazon, and eBay, each of which has made powerful new = forms of=20 peer reviewing central to their business success. The task now is to use similar methods to create a community of = experts=20 with the incentive to reward genuine public-policy innovation. The specific method I propose is for foundations to finance an=20 authoritative online clearinghouse of think-tank research with new = tools=20 to facilitate peer review. The existence of such a community would not eliminate the other = inexpert audiences that think-tank researchers seek to please. But it would create additional costs when think tanks attempt = to=20 exploit the ignorance of these audiences by engaging in plausible = but=20 misleading credit taking. Journalists, for example, could quickly consult the = clearinghouse to=20 assess whether a potential source was a popularizer or original = thinker.=20 The journalists would then have the means to both track down = additional=20 relevant sources for their articles and accurately designate the = sources=20 they ultimately choose to use. The closest precedent for this proposal may be the a pilot = project=20 developed by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office with the help of = New=20 York Law School's Community Patent Review project. Due to the difficulty in assessing the originality of patent=20 applications, the patent office now takes an average of four years = and=20 four months to issue a patent. And even then, many patents turn = out not to=20 be original because the patent office's staff lacks the expertise = to=20 accurately assess the originality of many patent applications. To solve those problems, the patent office is experimenting = with an=20 open online clearinghouse of patent applications, where = competitors and=20 other experts are invited to comment about the originality of a = particular=20 patent application. The think-tank peer-reviewing system I propose would result in = no=20 patent for originality, just a list of published citations and a=20 discussion of their relevance to the published work. The clearinghouse would provide an authoritative, time-stamped = citation=20 for think-tank research, which until now has often been=20 self-published. It would provide free or low-cost access to research that is = now=20 available free via think-tank Web sites. It would offer other researchers the incentive to identify the = missing=20 citations as a way to cultivate their own scholarly reputations; = reviewers=20 could also be rated, just as they are on many peer-reviewing = sites. And it would provide independent, professional reviewers with = powerful=20 new tools to rate think tanks the way they currently rate academic = publications and academic departments. Perhaps, for the first = time,=20 foundations would also find it feasible to sponsor Pulitzer = Prize-like=20 awards for innovative public-policy ideas backed by research. Many think tanks would continue to specialize in popularization = and=20 advocacy rather than research. But in that case their = truth-seeking,=20 academic pretensions would be less credible with the news media, = policy=20 makers, and foundations. The result would be additional incentives = for=20 think tanks to actually do significant, original research rather = than=20 merely claim they do. By separating the publishing from the reviewing process, a=20 well-designed public-policy clearinghouse would also spur relevant = and=20 timely academic research. Publishing is fast and reviewing is = slow, so by=20 disentangling the two, scholars gain a greater incentive to = contribute to=20 the many public-policy debates with a shorter time horizon than = the=20 traditional academic publishing cycle. Many creative efforts are under way to solve the problems of = the=20 academic publishing system, as illustrated by such innovations as = PubMed=20 Central (for government-financed peer-reviewed medical research), = the=20 Public Library of Science (for author-financed pre- publication = peer=20 review and public post-publication annotation), the Social Science = Research Network (for on-demand publishing of working papers and = other=20 non-peer-reviewed work), and PolicyFile (for fee-based access to = select=20 nonprofit public-policy research). The task is to bring the best of all these new publishing = approaches=20 together to reduce the incentives for public-policy plagiarism and = narrow=20 the current ethical chasm between universities and think = tanks. Grant makers have a public responsibility to do so because = their own=20 money derives from tax breaks provided by the federal = government. Foundations have the prestige and clout to bring about a new = think-tank=20 publishing approach because they are a primary sponsor of = think-tank=20 research and thus have the leverage to require the participation = of their=20 grant recipients. Grant makers have a public responsibility to do so because = their own=20 money derives from tax breaks provided by the federal = government. Individual foundations focused on short-term, tangible, = public-policy=20 achievements may have no more incentive to care about plagiarism = than do=20 Chinese consumers who benefit from pirated Hollywood movies. But = it is in=20 the long-term, collective interest of foundations to solve the = systemic=20 problems that are poisoning the well for innovative public-policy=20 research. The foundations that have historically been the largest = supporters of=20 public-policy research should recognize that, if they band = together, they=20 can be a powerful force to mitigate this great social harm. J.H. Snider is president of iSolon.org and a fellow at = Harvard=20 University's Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics, and Public = Policy.
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